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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Richard C. Wood, d/b/a Fernwood Candy & 
Ice Cream Company (hereinafter "Wood" or "Fernwoods"), respect-
fully files this Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Respon-
dents Robert W. Barnes, Jr., David C. Barnes, Susan B. Nielson, 
d/b/a The Barnes Family Partnership (hereinafter the "Partner-
ship"). 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Certain "facts" are set forth in Respondents' Reply 
Brief which do not conform to the evidence submitted and heard by 
the Trial Court on August 14, 15 and 16, 1984. Those "facts" 
will be discussed seriatum. 
1. In discussing Raymond A. Hintze's ("Hintze") letter 
dated September 6, 1979, the Partnership states: 
H i n t z e a l s o informed Wood t h a t t h e 
p a r k i n g l o t l e a s e had i n c r e a s e d t o 
$200.00 per month and, mistakenly, tha t 
Wood's share of the lease payment on the 
parking lo t would the rea f t e r be $100.00, 
for a t o t a l r en t a l payment of $1,060.00 
per month. Wood knew t h a t the Lease 
obl igated Wood to pay 75% of the parking 
l o t l e a s e or $150 and t h a t i t looked 
l i k e Hintze had made an e r r o r , but did 
not inform Hintze of the e r ror [R. 516] 
. The index used by H i n t z e t o 
determine esca la t ions in the rent based 
upon increases in the cost of l iy ing was 
the Consumer Pr ice Index for All Urban 
Consumers ("CPI-U"), p repared by the 
Bureau of Labor S t a t i s t i c s , U n i t e d 
- 1 -
S t a t e s Depa r tmen t of L a b o r . [R. 5 0 8 ; 
Ex. 2 1 ] . 
[Respondents ' Reply Br i e f , pp . 4 and 5 ] . 
On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y was 
had: 
Q: (By Mr. Hansen) When you r e c e i v e d 
t h e l e t t e r on Sep tember 6, 1979 , Mr. 
Wood, d i d you r e a l i z e t h a t Raymond 
H i n t z e h a d made w h a t i s c a l l e d a 
mis take in the c a l c u l a t i o n of t h e r e n t a l 
amount due and owing on t h e p a r k i n g 
l o t ? 
A: (By Mr. Wood) No, I d id n o t . 
[R. 5 1 8 ] . 
Moreover, at no time did Hintze testify as to the 
source of the calculations set forth in his September 6, 1979 
letter. The determination of the index used by Hintze was made 
by the Partnership's expert witness, Mark Papanikolas, by review-
ing the CPI-U Index. [R. 508]. Indeed, the September 6, 1979 
letter does not state that the increases are based upon the CPI-U 
Index. [Ex. 7]. 
2. The Partnership states as "fact": 
Shortly after the Young letter was sent, 
Wood called Hintze and told him the 
escalations may force Wood into bank-
ruptcy. [R. 356]. In fact these claims 
were false. Wood was not losing "seve-
ral" thousand dollars a year on the 
store and the small losses actually 
realized were artificially caused by 
the fact Wood substantially marked-
up the price of ice cream which he 
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sold to himself and arbitrarily allo-
cated to the store substantial overhead 
expenses incurred by the manufacturing 
arm of Wood's business. [R. 575-576, 
642, 658, 661]. 
[Respondents1 Reply Brief, pp. 5 and 6.] 
While Hintze testified that Wood had stated that the 
"Fernwood Palace location was in financial difficulty, that he 
could not afford to pay the rent, that he was going to have to 
close it down" and that "1 believe he even mentioned that it may 
put him in bankruptcy and that he would no longer be able to 
operate there" [R. 356-357], Hintze further testified that he 
believed that Wood was referring only to the Fernwood Palace 
location. [R. 385]. Contrary to the Partnership's assertion, 
the Palace location was, in fact, losing several thousand dollars 
a year. As of August 31, 1979, the Palace was operating at a net 
loss for the year of $1,366.68 [Ex. 24; R. 588]. This trend 
continued throughout 1979. By October 31, 1979, the Palace was 
operating at a loss of $3,450.26. [Ex. 25; R. 592]. As of Dec-
ember 31, 1979, the Palace was operating at a loss of $2,716.84. 
[Ex. 26; R. 593, 594]• The Partnership's claim that Wood "arbi-
trarily" allocated overhead expenses to the Fernwood's Palace is 
likewise unsupported by the record. Payroll taxes were allocated 
directly to each store in proportion to the salaries and wages 
for each store. [R. 642]. The remaining administrative and 
overhead expenses were allocated to the various Fernwood stores 
- 3 -
based upon the sales at each store. [R. 642-644]. The Partner-
ship's own expert, Mark Papanikolas, testified that such an 
allocation was proper. [R. 484-486]. 
3. The Partnership states as "fact": 
On February 14, 1980, under the guise 
that Wood had only recently been infor-
med of the expiration of the parking lot 
lease, Wood attempted to obtain a 
further reduction in the rent by claim-
ing that the expiration of the original 
parking lot lease constituted a default 
by Mrs. Barnes under the lease agree-
ment. [Exs. 10 & 12, R. 599]. In fact, 
Wood knew all about the expiration of 
the parking lot lease and the execution 
of the new parking lot lease back in the 
Fall of 1979 when the rental reduction 
to $1,000 a month was being negotiated. 
[R. 586-587, 611-613]. Hintze refused 
Wood's transparent attempt to renego-
tiate a better deal. [Exs. 11 & 13]. 
[Respondents' Reply Brief, pp. 7 and 8.] 
Contrary to the Partnership's assertion, Wood testified 
that he did not know about the expiration of the original parking 
lot lease and the execution of a new parking lot lease until 
approximately February of 1980. [R. 599, 633]. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PARTNERSHIP'S RELIANCE ON AMENDED 
FINDING OF FACT NO, 16 AND THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS IS MISPLACED, 
Amended Finding of Fact No. 16 provides: 
No agreement was requestedl or made 
concerning the escalation provisions of 
the lease and the $900,00 amount remains 
subject to the escalation provisions of 
the lease. 
This factual determination ignores the evidence presen-
ted at trial and applicable case law. Richard Wood and Gaylen 
Young testified that in all communications with Jacqueline Barnes 
[R. 616, 617, 618] and Hintze [R. 531, 533, 536, 540, 553, 557, 
559] , they stated that Fernwoods desired a fixed rental amount 
for the remainder of the lease term. Thus, unless the Trial 
Court completely disregarded the testimony of Richard Wood and 
Gaylen Young, there is no support whatsoever for Amended Finding 
of Fact No. 16. However, the Trial Court'& error consists not in 
its factual determination, which is not supported by substantial 
evidence, but in its application of the laW. 
The Partnership does not dispute that the agreement to 
modify Paragraph 3 of the Lease was supported by consideration. 
It is also undisputed that the Hintze letter of January 23, 1980 
does not state that the modification of the Lease to reduce the 
rent to $1,000.00 per month was for a period of one year only. 
- 5 -
If the modification was to have been for only one year, Hintze's 
letter would have so stated. It does not. Furthermore, if the 
$1,000.00 per month was to be a "base" rent from which future 
escalations under the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the Lease 
would be calculated, the letter would have provided that the 
$1,000.00 per month constituted a "base" rental amount. 
Rather than setting forth any of the provisions which 
the Partnership argues, and the Trial Court found, must be read 
into it, Hintze's January 23, 1980 letter simply states: 
. . . I have met with Jackie concerning 
the the Palace lease with Fernwoods 
and she is willing to reduce the rent to 
$1,000.00 per rent [sic] and forego her 
claim to the taxes which have accrued. 
[Ex. 9; R. 363, 364]. Hintze testified that he did not communi-
cate to either Gaylen Young or Richard Wood that the modification 
to the Lease Agreement was to be for only one year. [R. 392, 
393]. Hintze's January 23, 1980 letter modifying the obligation 
of Fernwoods to pay rent is unambiguous on its face and can only 
be construed as an agreement on the part of Jacqueline Barnes and 
the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes to accept the sum of $1,000.00 
per month as rent under the Lease for the remainder of the lease 
term. 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant Richard C. Wood, 
even if one were to find that Hintze's January 23, 1980 letter 
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is ambiguous, the law is clear that any ambiguity must be 
resolved against the Partnership. See, e.g. , Sears v. Riemersma, 
655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). Furthermore, under the doctrine 
of practical construction, the undisputed evidence that both the 
Estate of Jacqueline Barnes and the Partnership accepted for over 
two and one-half years, without complaint, the sum of 91,000.00 
per month as payment in full of Fernwood's obligation to pay 
rent is persuasive evidence that the modification to Paragraph 3 
1 
of the Lease Agreement was to be for th^ remainder of the lease 
term. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P,2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975). 
The Partnership further argues that any agreement 
modifying the Lease by deleting the escalation provision would 
have to be in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and that 
no such writing exists. [Respondents1 Reply Brief, p. 15]. 
Hintze's January 23, 1980 letters satisfies the require-
ments of the Statute of Frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (Repl. 
Vol. 3B 1984), provides in pertinent part: 
Every contract for the leasing for a 
longer period than one year . . . shall 
be void unless the contract, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is made in 
writing subscribed by the party by whom 
the lease or sale is to be made, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized in 
writing. 
Section 25-5-3 must be read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 
25-5-9 (Repl. Vol. 3B 1984), which provides!: 
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Every instrument required by the provi-
sions of this chapter to be subscribed 
by any party may be subscribed by the 
lawful agent of such party. 
It is undisputed that in the negotiations with Fern-
woods Raymond Hintze was the lawful agent of Jacqueline Barnes 
and the Estate of Jacqueline Barnes. [R. 337, 347, 391, 392]. 
Accordingly, Raymond Hintze's signature on the letter dated 
January 23, 1980 satisifies the provisions of Section 25-5-3 
insofar as it constitutes a writing subscribed by the lawful 
agent of the party by whom the Lease was made. Moreover, the 
letter dated January 23, 1980 constitutes a sufficient memoran-
dum, when read in conjunction with the Lease Agreement, to 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds. See Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 
P.2d 321 (Utah 1974). 
Even were the Court to find that the Hintze letter 
dated January 23, 1980 did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, 
Fernwoods' payment of $1,000,00 per month to the Partnership and 
its predecessor in interest from February 1, 1980 to Octo-
ber, 1982, without complaint being raised by the Partnership, 
constitutes sufficient part performance to avoid the Statute of 
Frauds. The Statute of Frauds has never been construed in a 
manner so as to perpetrate a fraud or injustice. This Court has 
recognized that part performance of a contract is an exception to 
the Statute of Frauds. "Part performance which will avoid the 
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statute of frauds may consist of any act which puts the party 
performing in such a position that nonperformance by the other 
would constitute fraud." In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 
259 P.2d 595, 601 (1953); Utah Mercur Gold Mining Company v. 
Herschel Gold Mining Company, 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094 (1943). 
To allow the Partnership to repudiate the modification 
of the Lease Agreement after having received, and accepted 
without complaint, the sum of $1,000.00 per month for two and 
one-half years, would constitute a fraud upon Fernwoods. Accor-
i 
dingly, Fernwoods1 performance of the modification to the Lease 
Agreement by paying $1,000.00 per month rent is sufficient to 
avoid the Statute of Frauds. 
In summary, Amended Finding of Fact No. 16 is not 
supported either by the testimony presented at trial or appli-
cable case law. Moreover, the Statute of Frauds was satisfied by 
Hintze's Janaury 23, 1980 letter. The Trial Court clearly erred 
when it held that the modification to Paragraph 3 of the Lease 
Agreement was for a period of one year onlv. 
POINT II 
THE PARTNERSHIP CANNOT RELY ON ITS SELF-
IMPOSED IGNORANCE TO BAR APPLICATION OF 
THE DOCTRINES OF WAIVER AND/OR ESTOPPEL. 
The evidence presented at trial was undisputed that for 
a period of over two and one-half years th$ Estate of Jacqueline 
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Barnes and the Barnes Family Partnership accepted, without 
complaint, the sum of $1,000.00 in full payment of Fernwoods1 
rental obligation. [R. 400, 414, 422, 425, 426, 429, 604]. 
The Trial Court could only find, as a matter of law, that the 
Partnership was barred from seeking arrearages in rent under 
either the doctrine of equitable estoppel or waiver. See e.g., 
Josephine and Anthony Corp. v. Horwitz, 58 A.D. 2d 643, 396 
N.Y.S. 2d 53 (1977); Perry v. Farmer, 47 Ariz. 185, 54 P.2d 999 
(1936); Haun v. Corkland, 55 Tenn. App. 292, 399 S.W.2d 518 
(1965). 
The Partnership argues that waiver can only occur where 
there is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. The 
Partnership states that it had no knowledge of the escalation 
clause in the contract, or that the full amount of rent called 
for by the Lease was not being paid, until the Summer of 1982. 
Therefore, the Partnership reasons, there could be no waiver of 
its claim for additional rent allegedly due and owing under 
Paragraph 3 of the Lease. Such an argument is without merit both 
as a matter of public policy and as a matter of law. 
The Partnership's argument is, in essence, that one may 
ignore the provisions of a written agreement and accept payments 
under the agreement for two and one-half years, or longer, and 
then, when one gets around to reading the agreement, sue for 
arrearages. The purpose of the law of contracts is to regulate 
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commercial relationships between parties. If one chooses not to 
read a contract, or stand on the provisions thereof, thereby 
inducing the other party to act in reliance upon the actions of 
the other, the law of contracts is frustrated if the party who 
has blissfully closed his eyes to the, agreement may thereafter 
1 
sue to enforce the terms of the contract that he has, himself, 
ignored. Indeed, the courts have uniformly held that a party is 
presumed to know whatever he might, with reasonable diligence, 
have discovered. See, e.g. , Hicks v. City of Los Angeles, 133 
C.A. 2d 214, 283 P.2d 1046 (Cal. App. 1955). This fundamental 
precept of contract law was eloquently Stated in Perbal v. Dazor 
Manufacturing Corp., 436 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1966) as follows: 
He who has at his disposal ihe means 
of knowing is held to know; . . . he 
who shuts his eyes when to oper^  them and 
look is to see is held to see; and . . . 
where there is a duty to use diligence, 
those facts which diligence will disco-
ver are presumed to be known under the 
law of notice. 
Id. at 686 (quoting State ex rel. Bell v. Yates, 231 Mo. 
276, 132 S.W. 672, 676). 
In the case at bar the Partnership must be held, as a 
matter of law, to have had knowledge of | the provisions of the 
Lease Agreement. The Estate of Jacqueline Barnes and the 
Partnership cannot sit idly by and accept monthly rental payments 
in the sum of $1,000.00 per month and ther^  sue for arrearages in 
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rent. The law imputes knowledge of the provisions of the Lease 
Agreement to the Partnership. Accordingly, by acceptance of the 
sum of $1,000.00 per month in full payment of Pernwood's rental 
obligation, the Partnership waived any claim for arrearages in 
rent. 
Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the Partnership 
did not waive increases in rent subsequent to October 12, 1982, 
the law is clear that by accepting the sum of $1,000.00 per month 
in full satisfaction of the rental obligation prior to October 
12, 1982, the Partnership waived any claim for arrearages in rent 
prior to that date. Illustrations 5 and 6 to Comment d of the 
Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord and Tenant, § 12.1 
(1977) provide: 
5. L leases a new hotel to T for 
ten years at an annual rental of 
$50,000. After entry, T discovers 
and informs L that he cannot operate the 
hotel profitably without a reduction in 
the rent. L agrees to accept $25,000 
a year in place of the $50,000 rent 
reserved in the lease, and does so for 
two years. At this point, T is not in 
default, and L cannot recover the 
difference between the rent reserved in 
the lease and the accepted rent. 
6. Same facts as in Illustration 5, 
except that after accepting the reduced 
rent for two years, L notifes T that he 
must pay the full $50,000 per year 
for the remainder of the term. An 
initial inquiry must determine, in the 
light of all the circumstances, what the 
parties agreed to in regard to the rent 
- 12 -
reduction. If the agreement was that 
the rent would be reduced until L 
notified T otherwise, or until T could 
pay the full rent, and the facts now 
establish that he can, T will be liable 
in the future for a rental of $50,000 
a year. If the agreement was that the 
reduction to $25,000 a year was for 
the balance of the term, L's repudiation 
of the rent reduction is effective for 
the future, unless there was considera-
tion for the agreement or it is enforce-
able under contract law. 
Under either Illustration 5 or 6 above, the Partnership 
could not recover for alleged arrearage^ in rent which occurred 
prior to October of 1982. 
In short, where the evidence is undisputed that the 
Estate of Jacqueline Barnes and the Partnership accepted the sum 
of $1,000.00 per month in full payment of Fernwoods1 rental 
obligation, the Trial Court erred, as a matter of law, when it 
held that the Partnership was not estopped, or had not waived, 
any claim for arrearages in rent. The fact that the Partnership 
proceeded in ignorance of the terms of the Lease Agreement avails 
the Partnership nothing. The law, in a case such as that at bar, 
will impute knowledge of the terms of the Lease to the Partner-
ship. The Trial Court committed reversible error in awarding the 
Partnership arrearages in rent. 
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POINT III 
THE PARTIES TO THE LEASE DID NOT AGREE 
TO USE THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
FOR DETERMINING INCREASES IN RENT, 
The Partnership contends that the Trial Court properly 
interpreted the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement 
by utilizing the United States Consumer Price Index, CPI-U, in 
calculating increases in rent for three reasons: 
1. The dispute concerning escalations under Paragraph 
3 of the Lease Agreement was resolved by entering into a modifi-
cation agreement in January, 1980 whereby the amount of the rent 
was reduced subject to future escalations. [Respondents' Reply 
Brief, p. 19]. 
2. Fernwoods acquiesced in the calculations made by 
Hintze based upon the CPI-U Index and had previously paid escala-
tions in the parking lot lease. [Respondents' Reply Brief, pp. 
19-20]. 
3. The term "United States Cost of Living Index" 
is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence was admissible to interpret 
the latent ambiguity in that term. [Respondents' Reply Brief, p. 
20] . 
Each of the Partnership's justifications for the Trial 
Court's erroneous holding fails under careful analysis. Hintze's 
September 6, 1979 letter does not state that the increases in 
- 14 -
rent were calculated on the basis of the Consumer Price Index. 
Rather, the letter states that " [w] e have obtained the cost of 
living figures from the United States Government . . . " [Ex. 
7]. It is true that the dispute was settled by the parties 
entering into a modified agreement in January of 1980, but not 
the modified agreement for which the partnership argues. The 
modification was for a reduction in rent to the sum of $1,000.00 
for the remainder of the lease term, wit^ h no future escalations. 
The Partnership's statement that "Wood cannot now for the first 
time object that the wrong index was used by Mrs. Barnes in 
calculating the rent increase in 1979" [Respondents' Reply Brief, 
p. 19] , is simply a misstatement of the facts. Throughout the 
trial of this action, Wood argued that the Consumer Price Index 
could not be used to calculate increases in rent under Paragraph 
3 of the Lease Agreement. 
In addition, the Partnership's! statement that "Wood 
acquiesced in the escalation calculations made by Hintze based 
upon the CPI-U and actually paid the increased rent calculated 
pursuant to that Index from September 1979 through January 1980" 
[Respondents' Reply Brief, p. 19], is, oncie again, not supported 
by any testimony introduced at trial. F^hile it is true that 
Fernwoods paid the requested increase in rent from September, 
1979 through January, 1980, there is no evidence in the record 
that Fernwoods knew that the Consumer Price Index had been 
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utilized to calculate increases in rent. Furthermore, the 
Partnership's argument that because Fernwoods had paid increases 
in the parking lot rent it somehow acquiesced in the use of the 
Consumer Price Index is without merit. Wood specifically testi-
fed that at no time was he informed that the increases in the 
parking lot rent were based upon increases in the Consumer Price 
Index. [R. 521]. 
Finally, the term "United States Cost of Living Index" 
is not ambiguous. The fact that such an index does not exist 
does not render the provision ambiguous. If Raymond Hintze, in 
drafting the Lease Agreement, had intended to utilize "<a United 
States cost of living index" he would have done so. Furthermore, 
if Hintze and Jacqueline Barnes had intended to use the CPI-U 
Index, the Lease Agreement should have so stated. It did not. 
Rather, the Lease Agreement of September 1, 1976, refers to "the 
United States Cost of Living Index" which can only have reference 
to a specific index. That such an index does not exist does not 
render the provision ambiguous, but rather renders it unenforce-
able. See Seattle-First National Bank v. Earl, 17 Wash. App. 
830, 565 P.2d 1215 (1977). 
The Partnership argues that the Consumer Price Index, 
CPI-U, fairly comports with the intention of the parties as 
testified to by Richard Wood. The Partnership's assertion is 
based upon the following exchange: 
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Q: (By Mr. Burbidge) And a t t he t ime 
you s i g n e d t h e l e a s e you assumed , d i d 
you n o t , t h a t t h e r e was a c o s t of l i v i n g 
index a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e United S t a t e s ; 
d i d n ' t you? 
A: (By Mr. Wood) I guess s o . 
Q: And you d i d n ' t c o n s i d e r t h a t i t 
would be some sub - index , l i k e a r eg ion 
of t he United S t a t e s ; d id you? 
A: No. 
Q: D i d n ' t even know they e x i s t e d ; d id 
you? 
A: I d id n o t . 
[R. 5 2 2 ] . 
What the Partnership's argument ignores is that there 
exist at least two other nationwide cost jof living indexes which 
could also arguably be applicable, the "Consumer Price Index, 
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, GPI-W" [R. 467; Ex. 22], 
as well as cost of living figures published by the Department of 
Commerce. [R. 476]. For Richard Wood to testify that he belie-
ved that a nationwide index would be utilized, covering the 
i 
national as a whole, is not testimony that Richard Wood intended 
that the Consumer Price Index, CPI-U, would be utilized. 
Hintze did not offer any testimony whatsoever as to why 
he utilized the CPI-U in calculating the rent increase set forth 
in his September 6, 1979 letter or whether the use of that Index, 
in his opinion, fairly comported with the intent of the parties. 
During the first day of trial, the only justification that the 
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Partnership's expert witness, Mark Papanikolas, testified to for 
utilizing the CPI-U Index to determine increases in rent was that 
that was the only index which was compiled in one source and it 
was easy to use. [R. 471, 472]. Indeed, Mr. Papanikolas did not 
determine until after his first day of testimony that Hintze had 
utilized the CPI-U Index in calculating the rent increase set 
forth in the September 6, 1979 letter. [R. 507, 508]. 
Citing Panorama Residential Protective Association v. 
Panorama Corporation, 28 Wash App. 923, 627 P.2d 121 (1981), the 
Partnership states that " [t]he fact that the Lease did not recite 
the precise name of the index and contained the language 'Cost of 
Living Index1 instead [of] 'Consumer Price Index' is not deter-
minative." [Respondents' Reply Brief, p. 21]. A close reading 
of Panorama Residential Protective Association, supra, shows that 
the use of the Consumer Price Index to calculate increases in 
rent was not an issue. 
The Trial Court, in awarding damages based upon increa-
ses in the "Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers, CPI-U" 
Index created obligations not agreed to or intended by the 
parties. The provisions of the Lease Agreement are unambiguous 
on their face and, accordingly, the parties are bound by the 
provisions therein. This Court must reverse the Trial Court's 
Judgment insofar as it awards arrearages in rent based upon 
increases in the Consumer Price Index, CPI-U, provides that rent 
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escalations under Paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement are to be 
determined based upon fluctuations in the Consumer Price Index, 
and establishes a current monthly rental amount due on the leased 
premises based upon increases in th£ Consumer Price Index. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
PARTNERSHIP JUDGMENT FOR INCREASES 
IN PROPERTY TAXES. 
Paragraph 4 of the Lease Agreement provides, in sub-
stance, that the Lessee [Fernwoods] was to pay 75% of any in-
crease in property taxes over the 1976 level "upon proof of 
I 
payment of the same [by the Lessor] . . .r 
With respect to the Trial Court's Judgment awarding the 
Partnership damages for increases in property taxes, there are 
two issues for this Court to decide. First, does Paragraph 4 of 
the Lease Agreement provide that Fernwoods need only pay an 
increase in property taxes "upon proof of payment of the same", 
thus creating a condition precedent to Fernwood's obligation to 
pay an increase in property taxes. Second, did the Partnership 
fulfill this condition precedent prior to trial. The Partner-
ship's Reply Brief addresses neither of these fundamental issues. 
1 
It is undisputed that words such las "upon the happening 
of such event" or similar language connote an intention for a 
condition rather than a promise or covenant. See, e.g. , Hohen-
berg Brothers Company v. George E. Gibbons & Company, 537 S.W. 2d 
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1 (Tex. 1976); Kosberg v. Brownr 601 S.W. 2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1980). Paragraph 4 of the Lease Agreement clearly sets forth a 
condition precedent to Fernwoods' obligation to pay increases 
in property taxes - that the Partnership first tender to Fern-
woods proof of payment by the Partnership of an increase. 
In answer to the second issue before the Court, it is 
undisputed that the Partnership did not tender, prior to trial, 
proof of payment by the Partnership of increases in property 
taxes on the leased premises. [R. 414, 430, 605]. 
Recognizing that Paragraph 4 sets forth a condition 
precedent to the payment of property taxes by Fernwoods, the 
Partnership argues that this Court should construe the condition 
precedent as a covenant. [Respondents' Reply Brief, pp. 23, 
24]. To accept the Partnership's invitation would be to impermis-
sibly rewrite or "reform" the Lease. This Court has repeatedly 
held that neither it, nor a trial court, can rewrite unambiguous 
contract provisions. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 
P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984); Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, 
Inc. , 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). 
The failure of the Partnership to tender proof of 
payment of any increases in property taxes to Fernwoods bars the 
Partnership's action for any increases in property taxes. 
Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221 
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(19 5 8) ; N.R. Nielsen and Son, Contrac|torsf Inc v. Myrick, Cris-
well, Branney, 527 P.2d 935 (Colo. Apb. 1974). The Judgment of 
the Trial Court must be reversed insofjar as it awards the Part-
nership damages for increases in property taxes on the leased 
premises. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth abbve, this Honorable Court 
should reverse the Judgment of the Thirjd Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DATED this ^jm day of October, 1985. 
J.//MICHAEL HANSEN, Esq. 
)f and for 
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Candy & ice Cream Company 
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